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Abstract: Today, Model Based Safety Analysis 
processes become more and more widespread to 
achieve the safety analysis of a system. However 
and at our knowledge, there is no formal testing 
approach to ensure that the formal model is 
compliant with the real system. In the paper, we 
choose to study AltaRica model. We present a 
general process to well construct and validate an 
AltaRica formal model. The focus is made on this 
validation phase, i.e. verifying the compliance 
between the model and the real system. For it, the 
proposed process recommends to build a 
specification for the AltaRica model. Then, the 
validation process is transformed to a classical 
verification problem between an implementation and 
a specification.  We present the first phase of a 
method to verify the compliance between the model 
and the specification. 
Keywords: Model Based Safety Analysis, validation, 
formal model, AltaRica
1. Introduction 
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) is a methodology 
which aims to base the development of a system on 
the creation, the refinement and the integration of 
models.  MDE was created to increase productivity 
by, for example, simplifying the design or promoting 
communication between the different teams working 
on a same project.  
If at the beginning, MDE was focused on the 
development of software systems, its applications 
are nowadays more spread and deal for example 
with the achievement of safety analyses. Thus, 
where MDE is generally focused on the automatic 
generation of code (e.g. C, C++), Model Based 
Safety Analysis (MBSA) aims to provide a model to 
automatically perform classical safety analyses such 
as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Failures Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) ([8]). 
Concerning this MBSA, several works ([9]) propose 
to assess the safety of systems by allowing 
simulation, the automatic generation of fault trees or 
searching automatically failure scenarios leading to 
undesired events. Amongst all the languages, we 
have chosen to use AltaRica which was designed to 
formally describe the functional and dysfunctional 
behaviour of a system. 
In a general way, the process to study the behaviour 
of a model can be divided into three main parts:  
• Modelling activity. System components and their 
behaviours are described in an adapted formal 
language. Methodologies and guidelines can be 
written to give rules and best practices. These 
guidelines aim at both helping the model design 
and encouraging the reusability of models (by , 
for example, standardizing information 
implemented in the model);  
• Validation of the model. This step ensures that 
the model is a valid abstraction of the real 
system (correct hypotheses and same 
behaviours). Without this step, the next one can 
be useless; 
• Verification of the specification. We check that 
the model holds the system’s specifications.  
In this paper, we deal with the second point. Indeed, 
although the problem of validation of AltaRica 
models is not well address in the literature, this 
validation seems to be essential in order to check if 
safety analyses are generated from erroneous or 
incomplete models.  
The paper introduces the first steps of a validation 
process for AltaRica models. Section 2 presents an 
overview of the classical safety analysis process. 
With showing some limits of this kind of analyses, we 
present the motivation for the use of MBSA. Then, 
the AltaRica language is described in section 3. 
Sections 4 to 7 are devoted to the presentation of 
the validation process for AltaRica models. In the 
sections 6 and 7, the work is focused on the unit 
validation, i.e. the validation of the AltaRica 
component library. Finally, last section presents a 
conclusion of our work and futures works. 
2. From classical safety analysis to MBSA 
2.1 Definitions 
Before describing the classical safety analyses, 
some definitions, strongly inspired from [1], are 
introduced.  
• Failure: the inability of an item to perform its 
intended function.  
• Failure condition: Condition with an effect on the 
system and its users, caused by one or several 
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failures. It depends on both operational and 
environmental conditions. 
• Failure mode: the way in which the failure of an 
item occurs. 
2.2 Classical safety analyses 
Safety engineering ensures that the safety 
requirements (extracted from international 
standards) are held by the system considering all 
potential failure modes of each component. In this 
purpose, safety studies aim to define the safety 
requirements and then ensure that the system fulfils 
its required properties. In industrial practice, we can 
distinguish the following types of safety analyses.
• Assessment of qualitative requirements. The 
objective is to demonstrate that no combination 
of events with less than N individual failures 
leads to the failure condition (N depends on the 
severity of the failure condition).  
• Assessment of quantitative requirements. The 
objective is to compute the occurrence 
probability of failure condition.  
To perform the safety analyses, safety engineers 
traditionally use the Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) and the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
([8]).  
Building a FMEA consists in identifying all the 
potential failure modes of each system component 
and analysing their local and global effects on the 
system.  
A FTA is a top down approach which illustrates the 
way in which low level component failures or events
contribute to the global system failure condition. 
Thus, an FTA begins with a defined failure condition 
and breaks it down into basic failure modes identified 
in the FMEA. One strong advantage of the FTA is its 
simple formalism. After doing the breaking down, the 
FTA become a logic gate network. In this network, 
the failure condition is described by a logic equation 
from which we can extract failure scenarios. From 
this logic equation, it is even possible to compute the 
occurrence probability of the failure condition during 
the considered mission.  
2.3 Toward Model Based Safety Assessment 
Although FMEA and FTA are classical methods, 
several limits can be seen. 
• The size and the complexity of current industrial 
systems grow. They become highly 
reconfigurable and performing the identification 
of failure scenarios without model can be error 
prone; 
• Because a fault tree describes only one failure 
condition, it can be heavy to build all fault trees 
for all failure conditions; 
• In case of modification of the system, several 
fault trees would have to be updated; 
• Even if the formalism of fault trees allows an 
easy computation of qualitative and quantitative 
results, this formalism is different from the 
representation of the system. The fault trees can 
be difficult to read for someone outside the 
safety domain, especially when the number of 
terminal events is important. 
We think these limits can be overcome by 
performing the safety analysis activities on formal 
model of the system under development. Instead of 
building one fault tree for each failure condition, we 
provide a formal model describing both the nominal 
system behaviour and the dysfunctional behaviour of 
the system. On this model, several failure conditions 
can be studied. The failure scenarios as well as the 
FTA could be automatically generated. 
Figure 1 : The two approaches 
2.4 Toward a rigorous process for MBSA 
So, MBSA can help to tackle several limits shown by 
the classical approach. But, today, the modelling 
process of these formal models is based, as for the 
classical approach, on informal sources. 
Indeed, FMEA and FTA are based on informal 
sources such as regulations (for the identification of 
failure conditions and requirements), design 
documents and field experience. Thus, they are 
highly dependant on the skill and also on the 
interpretation of safety engineers in charge of the 
analysis. Moreover, the validation process of FMEA 
and FTA is mainly based on 1) the verification by 
experts that no failure mode is forgotten in the 
FMEA, 2) that the effect of the failure modes are well 
described and 3) that all failure scenarios are 
considered in the FTA. Thus, validation process 
remains a mere proofreading and is all but formal. 
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Today, the same report can be made about the 
model based approach. 
To solve this problem, the paper presents a global 
process for the rigorous AltaRica modelling of a 
system. The focus is made on the validation of these 
AltaRica models. 
3. The AltaRica language 
Amongst all the languages available in the literature 
to perform MBSA, we have chosen to use AltaRica 
[2], a formal modelling language, developed at 
LaBRI to describe both functional and dysfunctional 
behaviour of a system. It allows representing the 
failure propagations in an industrial system.  
The language is carried out by the tool Cecilia™ 
OCAS (for example) which provides a graphical 
interface to design models and allow analysing them 
by different ways such as simulation, automatic 
generation of minimal cuts (i.e. shortest scenarios 
leading to the failure condition) or sequences (i.e. 
ordered cuts). 
AltaRica language is hierarchical and compositional. 
Each component is described by a mode automaton 
[3]. The basic unit to model a system component is 
called a “node” and is composed with three different 
parts: 1) the declaration of variables and events; 2) 
the definition of transitions; 3) the definition of 
assertions. 

Each component has a finite number of flow 
variables and state variables. Flow variables are the 
inputs and the outputs of the node: they are the links 
between the node and its environment. State 
variables are internal variables which are able to 
memorize current or previous functioning mode (for 
example, failure mode). In our models, these 
variables (flow and state) are either Boolean or 
enumerated. Then, each node owns also events 
which modify the value of state variables. These 
events are phenomenon such as a failure, a human 
action or a reaction to a change of one input value. 
The transitions describe how the state variables are 
modified. They are written such as “G(s,v) |- E ->s_” 
where G(s,v) is a Boolean condition on state s and 
input variables v, E is the event and s_ is the effect 
of the transition on state variables. If the condition G 
is true, then event E can be triggered and state 
variables are modified as described in s_. 
The assertions describe how output variables are 
constrained by the input and state variables. 

These concepts are illustrated by the following 
example.  
node component 
  flow 
input: {ok, low, null}: in;  
output: {ok, low, null}: out;  
  state 
ST = {ok, degraded, lost}; 
  init 
 ST:=ok;  
  event 
 Degradation, Fail; 
  trans 
ST=ok |- Degradation -> ST:= Degraded; 
ST=ok or ST=degraded |- Fail -> ST =lost; 
  assert 
       output = case { ST=ok : input,  
ST=degraded and input=ok: low, 
 else null} ;  
edon
This component has one input and one output
variables both ranging over the domain {ok, low, 
null}, one state variable ST ranging over the domain 
{ok, degraded, lost} and two events Degradation and 
Fail. At the initial instant, the node is in state “ok”. 
The event Degradation (respectively Fail) describes 
a failure which leads the node into the state 
“degraded” (respectively “lost”). “Degradation” 
(respectively “Fail”) can be triggered only if the node 
is in state “ok” (respectively in the state “ok” or 
“degraded”). The assertion means that the output 
value is equal to the input one if the node is in state 
“ok”. The output value is equal to “low” if the state is 
“degraded” and the input value is “ok”. In every other 
case, the output value is “null”.  
To build the model of the global model, several 
nodes are interconnected.  

Thus, failures are propagated via nodes by their 
inputs and outputs. Failures can also be propagated 
by synchronizations which simulate the failure of 
several components at the same time. Hierarchy of 
nodes can be used to model complex components 
and build the model of the global system. Once the 
global model is obtained, the AltaRica model allows 
analysing failure condition. Different tools can 
calculate, for example, minimal cut sets or the 
occurrence rate of a failure condition. 
4. Validation in literature 
Validation of classical safety analyses is mainly 
based on several proofreadings (by engineers and/or 
experts). Based on formal models, we believe that 
the new approach can benefit from a more 
elaborated validation process. 
A lot of works aim at ensuring that a formal model 
meets a given specification ([4], [5]). Such a work is 
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used to verify that the real system (pictured by the 
model) meets its specification and its requirements.   
But one strong hypothesis under this kind of work is 
that the model behaviour is in accordance with the 
behaviour of the real system… which is, according to 
us, far from obvious! Thus, we believe that it is 
essential to verify that the two behaviours (model 
and real system) are coherent before verifying that 
some properties are hold by the model.  
Testing compliance between a specification and the 
model is dependant from both the specification form 
and the model language. The following of this 
section presents two techniques extracted from 
literature to verify the compliance of the model with 
the real system.  
4.1 Step-by-step simulation 
For the validation of the model, one of the most 
overwhelmed methods is based on the step-by-step 
simulation of the model.  This method ensures, for 
tested scenarios, that the model behaves as the real 
system. Nevertheless, this method is not perfect.  
• Due to its nature, this method is not exhaustive. 
Indeed, an exhaustive simulation is often not 
feasible (at human scale) due to the large 
number of scenarios playable by the model. 
• We don’t have, to our knowledge and for 
AltaRica model, a way to measure the quantity 
of model covered by the test set. In the same 
way, we don’t know which part of the model is 
tested by the test set (and which part is not).   
In literature, works introduce different methods to 
generate relevant test cases from a given 
specification. For example, [4] presents a formal 
testing method developed for Statechart. The paper 
identifies, from a Statechart specification, a set of 
test cases to verify the compliance of an 
implementation and its specification. 
4.2 Model Checking 
To validate the model, another method advocated by 
literature is the model checking. The goal is to test if 
a property is held by the system. For it, the property 
is stated as a temporal logic formula. Then the 
model checker (i.e. the tool for applying model 
checking) tests if this property is valid in any state of 
the model. When a formula is not valid, the tool 
produces a counter example giving a scenario which 
violates the property. The counter-example can be 
useful to correct and update the model.  
So, if model checking allows verifying properties on 
a model, it allows, in particular, verifying the 
conformity of the model in comparison with the real 
system. But some difficulties; described above, can 
be highlighted.  
• Properties can be difficult to find and to formalize 
by engineers and experts; 
• For a property, the model-checker provides only 
one counter-example. 
Typically, the kind of property verified on the formal 
model is properties that the real system has to hold. 
For example, we can verify that no single failure 
leads to the loss of the system. But for our 
application, we will have to verify properties that the 
real system holds. So identifying properties needs a 
great experience and an excellent knowledge of the 
system and its behaviour.  
For AltaRica language, previous works have 
developed a platform between AltaRica and the 
model checker SMV [10]. 
5. A validation process 
5.1 High level view of the process 
MBSA is clearly a promising approach to overcome 
limits shown by classical safety analyses. But, to use 
MBSA in industrial domain, we believe that it’s very 
important to have a method of validation of the 
model. For this purpose, we envisage two major 
phases: 1) guiding the modelling phase to prevent 
some errors and 2) validating the models to detect 
and eliminate remaining errors. The first subject is 
not the point here. Details can be found in [6]. Here, 
the focus is done on the validation phase of an 
AltaRica model. According to us, a high level view of 
the general validation process can be pictured as 
below. 
Figure 2 : High level validation process

5.2 Validation process proposal 
We introduce in this part a general method for the 
three levels of validation described above (unit, 
integrated and global). The general strategy of this 
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• Build a schematic representation of the system 
under study (this representation will play the role 
of a specification); 
• Verify that the AltaRica model is compliant with 
this representation.  
Thus, we transform the validation problem of an 
AltaRica model into a “classical” verification problem 
between a specification and an implementation. In 
the following, we call SFPM (Specification of Failure 
Propagation Model) the specification of the AltaRica 
model and AIFP (AltaRica Implementation of the 
Failure Propagation model) the implementation of 
the AltaRica model.  
At this moment, the careful and cautious reader 
won't do any assumptions on the form of the SFPM. 
Indeed, according to us, the form of the SFPM will 
be different depending on the level of validation 
(unit, integrated and global). 
The proposed process can be divided into two steps:  
Concerning the SFPM:
• Define the SFPM from informal documents; 
• Define the coverage criteria of the SFPM. What 
do we want to test on the SFPM? (the criteria 
will differ depending on the form of the SFPM 
and the goal of the validation); 
• From both the SFPM and its coverage criteria, 
we generate test cases which cover these 
criteria. 
Concerning the AIFP:
• Define coverage criteria on the AIFP. What do 
we want to test on the AIFP? (i.e. defining 
coverage criteria on AltaRica models); 
• Play the test cases extracted from the SFPM on 
the AIFP. Checking of outputs and behaviours 
(state transfer); 
• Check on the AIFP which part of the AIFP is 
covered by the SFPM test cases according to 
the AIFP coverage criteria; 
• Identify AIFP parts uncovered by SFPM test 
cases; 
• Generate test cases to cover these uncovered 
AIFP parts; 
• Play these test cases and check for outputs and 
behaviours. 
To well understand this process let us explicit two 
particular points of uncertainty in the process. First 
the SFPM might not be complete (i.e. it might not 
contain all of the real system’s behaviour). Indeed, 
this SFPM arises from human work and might not 
contain all possible execution path of the AIFP. So, 
giving coverage criteria on the SFPM, generating 
test cases and playing them on the AIFP give 
confidence in the methodology but are not sufficient. 
AIFP can embed more information and more 
behaviours than the SFPM; some of them are true, 
some other are wrong behaviour and have to be 
detected and annihilated. Giving coverage criteria on 
AIFP prove that the model has been “sufficiently” 
tested. One other advantage of testing AIFP is that 
we can possibly complete the SFPM afterwards.  
We believe that this general process can be applied 
and adapted to each kind of validation (unit, 
integrated and global). Depending on the validation 
level, parts of the process will change; in particular, 
the form of the SFPM will be different, different 
coverage criteria will be defined. In the following, our 
work has been focused on the unit validation (i.e. the 
validation of an AltaRica node).  
Figure 3 : A proposal for the validation process 
6. Construction of the SFPM 
In this section, we deal with the definition and the 
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Model (SFPM) for an AltaRica node (for the unit 
validation).   
In a general way and to justify the existence of 
SFPM, we consider that building a first 
representation of the component’s behaviour (even if 
it is incomplete but was validated by the experts) is 
a prerequisite to build the AltaRica node and help at 
its validation.   
6.1: SFPM Requirements 
Before dealing with the form and the chosen 
formalism for this SFPM, we present three major 
requirements for this SFPM.  
• The SFPM should depict correctly the real 
component behaviour;  
• The SFPM has to be understandable by experts;  
• The SFPM should be as formal as possible.  
Concerning the first point and according to previous 
section, the SFPM is a critical point for the validation 
of AltaRica models. Indeed, as a specification, the 
SFPM is the reference of the AltaRica model, i.e. if 
the SFPM contains errors, the AltaRica model will 
contain errors too. Thus, the SFPM should be a 
correct depiction of the real system behaviour.  
About the second point and because the SFPM have 
to be validated by experts, the SFPM needs to be 
written down in an easily understandable form. 
About this point, we agree that validating the SFPM 
by a mere expert proofreading is rather strange. 
However, we believe that having a schematic 
representation of the system is a prerequisite to build 
and validate the AltaRica model. Moreover, the focus 
is made here on the unit validation, i.e. the validation 
of a component of the AltaRica model. So, the size 
of the SFPM will be limited and, for the expert, easier 
to validate than the global AltaRica model.  
The last requirement is that the SFPM has to be as 
formal as possible. Indeed, SFPM is the starting 
point for the generation of test cases. To allow a 
systematic generation of these test cases, having a 
formal (at least a semi-formal) description of the 
SFPM will be useful. 
Taking into account these three requirements, the 
following subsection proposed a form for this SFPM.  
6.2: SFPM building 
To build this SFPM, a variety of methods / 
formalisms can be found in literature to picture and 
formalize the behaviour of a system. This includes, 
for example, decision tables (which output for which 
inputs?), Petri networks, Markov chains, Finite State 
Machines, UML diagrams, mode automata. The 
general purpose of this SFPM is to be a kind of 
bridge between informal documents (design 
documents, safety analysis or / and failure analysis 
documents) and the AltaRica model. For practical 
reasons and because of the AltaRica language, we 
choose, a Mode Automata like form. We are 
conscious that it is irrelevant to ask an analyst for a 
complete mode automaton. We suppose here that 
the analyst can write little parts of mode automata 
and existing tools can compute these parts into a 
complete mode automaton.  
To achieve that, we propose to:  
• Model the inputs / outputs of the component with 
a block diagram; 
• Model the states and transitions with a classical 
state – transition UML diagram; 
• Add to this state-transition diagram the 
assertions, i.e. the value of the outputs 
depending on the state and the input. The 
assertions will be written as ITE (If Then Else).  
On the Figure 4, (a) is the block diagram describing 
the inputs, the outputs and their types. On the 
example, the inputs and the outputs are enumerated. 
The figure (b) describes the three states “Ok”, 
“Degraded” and “Lost” of the automaton, the 
transitions “Fail” and “Degradation”, and the value of 
the output in each state. Two remarks can be made: 
• If a guard of a transition depends on the value of 
one or several inputs, the state – transition 
diagram will picture input change as transition, 
• A state of the automaton won’t be automatically 
pictured by one AltaRica state variable. Here, we 
will use one AltaRica state variable with three 
values {Ok, Degraded, Lost}.   
Figure 4 : Proposal for the SFPM 
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We believe that these kinds of diagrams are 
sufficiently clear, explicit and comprehensible to be 
validated by experts. Taking the hypothesis that we 
can transform these diagrams into a mode 
automaton, these diagrams will be considered as a 
reference (i.e. a specification) for both the 
implementation of the component model (modelling 
activities) and the validation of the implemented 
model. Thus, our problem can be considered as a 
classical problem of verification that an 
implementation is correct with respect to its 
specification. 
6.3: AIFP building 
From the SFPM, the AIFP is manually built. 
Concerning our example, the SFPM represented on 
Figure 4 corresponds to the AltaRica model 
presented in section 3. 
7. Verification of the AIFP 
At this stage, we have at our disposal the SFPM and 
the AIFP. We want now to validate the AIFP 
according to the process described in section 5. 
7.1: SFPM and AIFP coverage criteria 
First, we have to define the objectives of the 
verification. So, we must define what we want to test 
on both SFPM and AIFP, i.e. the coverage criteria on 
SFPM and AIFP.  
SFPM coverage: On the SFPM, the coverage criteria 
are:  
• the coverage of all states; 
• the coverage of all transitions;  
• the coverage of the assertions. For the 
assertions and because they are written under 
“If Then Else” form, we can choose classical 
coverage criteria of the DO178B [7]. Here, we 
choose the Condition / Decision coverage. 
AIFP coverage: Defining coverage criteria for the 
AIFP consists in defining criteria for an AltaRica 
model.  
Our coverage criterion is to cover the transitions and 
the assertions of the AltaRica model.  
About the transitions, let us remind that AltaRica 
transitions are written under the form “G(s,v) |- E -
>s_”. We transform this form into “If (G(s,v) and E) 
then s_”. The meaning is identical. But, written under 
“If Then Else” form, we can apply classical coverage 
criteria defined in DO178B. We choose the condition
/ decision coverage:  
• Condition coverage: a condition is a simple 
Boolean expression, i.e. it can not be broken 
down into a simpler Boolean expression; the 
condition coverage means that each condition 
has to be evaluated to both true and false. 
• Decision coverage (or branch coverage): the 
entire Boolean expression has to be evaluated 
to both true and false.  
The AltaRica assertions are written under “If Then 
Else” form. So again, we can apply coverage criteria 
of the DO178B. We choose also the condition / 
decision coverage. 
7.2: Preliminary for AIFP verification 
Here, we want to directly measure the effectiveness 
of the test strategy on the AltaRica model. We 
present thus a way to measure the coverage of the 
model by introducing flags into the model.  
Measure of the coverage of the AltaRica transitions:  
To measure the coverage of the AltaRica transitions, 
we follow the following step. 
• We transform AIFP transitions according to the 
condition coverage of the DO178B, i.e. 
transforming “A or B |- E  s_” into two 
transitions “A |- E  s_” and “B |- E  s_”. Thus, 
each transition has a unique condition, i.e. the 
guard of each transition can not be broken into a 
simpler Boolean expression; 
• We add to the AltaRica model one Boolean state 
variable ST_T_i per modified transition; 
• We initialize them to “false”; 
• We transform transition such as: 
“A |- E  s_ & ST_T_1:=true”  
“B |- E  s_ & ST_T_2:=true”;
• We add an observer to the AltaRica model. The 
observer is true if all ST_T_i are true. That 
means that all transitions have been covered.  
Measure of the coverage of the AltaRica assertions: 
To measure the effective coverage of the AltaRica 
assertions, we follow the following step.
• We transform AIFP assertions according to the 
condition coverage of the DO178B, i.e. 
transforming:
“case { A or B: V1,  
        else V2}”  
Into  
“case { A: V1,  
             B: V1,  
            else V2}”.
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• We add an integer local variable named LOC 
with the same form of the output variable:  
“LOC = case { A: 1,  
                          B: 2, 
                          else 3}” 
• We add to the AltaRica model one boolean state 
variable ST_A_i per assertion 
• We initialize them to “false” 
• We add one transition for each assertion: 
“LOC=i and ST_A_i=false |- Dirac(0) 
ST_A_i=true” where Dirac(0) is an instantaneous 
event 
• We add an observer to the AltaRica model. The 
observer is true if all ST_A_i are true: that 
means that all assertions have been covered. 
7.3: Verification of the AIFP  
The first objective is to verify that the AIFP satisfies 
the properties of the SFPM. According to the SFPM 
coverage criteria (cf. 7.1); it consists in detecting, in 
the AIFP, missing states, transitions or assertions 
presents in the SFPM. 
The second objective is to verify that there is no 
unwanted information in the AIFP. According to the 
AIFP coverage criteria, it consists in detecting extra 
states, transitions or assertions in the AIFP. 
Verification of the AIFP:  SFPM criteria
For verifying the properties of the SFPM on the 
AIFP, the first step is to generate a set of test cases 
that satisfies the SFPM coverage criteria. Then, 
those test cases are simulated on the AIFP.  
Generation of the test cases: From the SFPM, we 
generate automatically test cases. Written as mode 
automata, our approach uses different works of the 
literature ([4], [5]).  
The general principle of our approach is:  
• Use the state-transition diagram of the SFPM (of 
the mode automata) to generate a first set of test 
cases which cover all states and transitions. 
• Use the assertion part of the SFPM to complete 
the first set of test cases in order to cover the 
assertions. For it, we can use works about the 
coverage of imperative code ([7]). 
Simulation of the test cases on the AIFP: Once these 
test cases obtained, we simulate them on the AIFP. 
It consists in checking if the actual output is the 
expected one (defined in the SFPM) and if after each 
transition, the state transfer is correct. To achieve 
this task, a great help is given by the step-by-step 
simulation tool of Cecilia™ OCAS. Indeed, thanks to
this tool, every state and every output are 
observable. So checking for correct output and 
correct state transfer is a very easy task. If an error 
occurred (wrong output / wrong value of a variable 
state), the model is updated and tested again. When 
no error is claimed by the verification, we can go 
further on the process.  
Moreover, during the simulation, we check, on the 
AIFP, for the potential activation of the flag ST_T_i 
and ST_A_i. 
Verification of the AIFP: AIFP coverage
Previous subsection has tested the AIFP according 
to SFPM coverage criteria. The objectives were to 
discover missing states, transitions or assertions in 
the AIFP (with respect to the SFPM). Here, our 
objective is to detect extra states, transitions or 
assertions in the AIFP. Potentially, these extra 
information can be wrong (i.e. errors in the AIFP), or 
true (i.e. errors in the SFPM). 

So, in this section, we want to generate test cases to 
test the AIFP according to AIFP coverage criteria. 
For it and in the previous subsection (during the 
simulation of test cases extracted from the SFPM), 
the analyst has checked for the activation of the 
flags ST_T_i and ST_A_i. Here, we suppose that the 
analyst in charge of the verification knows the list of 
all defined flags, i.e. he knows all defined ST_T_i 
and ST_A_i.  
So, our objectives here are the followings:  
• Analysing which parts of the AIFP are not tested  
by the test cases extracted from the SFPM; 
• Generating test cases to cover these parts. 
About the first point, the analyst knows the list of all 
existing flags and the list of already activated flags 
(by the tests extracted from the SFPM).  So, 
identifying the list of non-activated flag (the list of 
untested parts of the AIFP) is trivial.  
Then, for each non-activated flag, we use the 
sequence generator tool of Cecilia™ OCAS to 
identify scenarios which activate these flags (for 
each flag, we obtain a list of scenario which activates 
this flag). Then, we choose the minimal list of 
scenarios which activates all non-activated flags. 
This minimal list corresponds to the test cases set.  
Then, for each of these test cases, we play it on the 
AIFP (i.e. on the AltaRica model) and we observe 
the output and the state transfer. Here, to know if 
they are correct, our reference is an expert 
judgement.   
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In a general way and all along the process, if an 
error is detected, we have to check if the error is due 
to the SFPM or the AIFP. If it is due to the AIFP, we 
update the AIFP and have to play again the test 
cases extracted form the SFPM (and following step). 
If the error is due to the SFPM, the SFPM has to be 
updated and the total process has to be re-started.
According to us, when we have no errors at the end 
of the process, the validation of our AltaRica node is 
finished.  
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, we outlined several important aspects 
of the design process of an AltaRica model (and 
more generally of a formal model). Amongst these 
aspects, the most important are 1) having a 
specification model and 2) transform the validation 
problem into a verification problem between the 
implementation and the specification.  
The first point, not presented in details in the paper, 
consists in transforming a design from an informal 
description into a detailed and formal (at least semi-
formal) specification usable for both the modelling 
and validation activities.  
The second point, which is the subject of the paper, 
is to check that the implementation (i.e. the AltaRica 
model) is consistent with this specification. Coverage 
criteria are given and a process is described to 
generate automatically test cases which cover (with 
respect to the defined coverage criteria) the AltaRica 
model.  
However, we argued that validation of AltaRica 
model is needed but we base this validation on a 
specification model validated by experts. Works will 
be described in [6] to present a process for the 
modelling activities which can be an input for a 
rigorous building of this specification. Also and for 
future study, a rigorous way to transform the 
specification into the implementation could be 
considered.    
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11. Glossary 
MDE:  Model-Driven Engineering 
MBSA: Model Based Safety Analysis 
FTA:  Fault tree Analysis 
FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
SFPM: Specification of Failure Propagation Model 
AIFP:  AltaRica Implementation of Failure Propagation 
model 
